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ARISTOTLE ON NATURAL LAW
Max Salomon Shellens
WHEN DISCUSSING LAW AND JUSTICE philosophers and historians almost in-
variably claim that Aristotle' is the father of natural law. The truth of this
claim will not be contested here. However, without a clear understanding of
what Aristotle meant by the expression "natural law," the claim that he was
the father of natural law has little significance.
1. Aristotle did not coin the term 81Kauov cvo0-K'V, nor was he the first per-
son to relate 'justice' to 'nature.' It is important to stress this in order to ap-
preciate fully the way he approaches the problem of natural law in its various
aspects. Largely through the teachings of the Sophists the expression SKatov
4vov had become quite popular by the time of Aristotle. 2 Despite con-
siderable doctrinal differences in various dicta of the Sophists concerning the
8tKatov cVCtKoV they all share a polemical character. Aristotle's treatment of
this subject is polemical too; but what distinguishes him from his predeces-
sors is the fact that he endeavors to overcome a purely negative attitude,
thereby turning a slogan into a serious problem. In sum, by clarifying the
idea of justice as a whole, he seeks a constructive approach to the problem
of 8,Katov04,TKoV.
The far-reaching significance of his achievement has not yet been fully
appreciated. Hence a new and unbiased inquiry seems to be desirable.
3
Only a classical philologist could determine the manner in which the vari-
ous Aristotelian writings on natural law are related to one another; and only
he could determine the chronological order of these writings. Solutions to
1. The following abbreviations are being used in the footnotes:
An. Pr.: Analytica Priora M.M.: Magna Moralia
C.: Categories Poe.: Poetics
E.E.: Eudemian Ethics Pol.: Politics
E.N.: Nicomachean Ethics Rh.: Rhetoric
M.: Metaphysics
2. See my essay, Der Begriff des Naturrechts bei den Sophisten, 32 ZEITSCHRIFT DER
SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FiR RECHTSGESCHICHTE (Rom. Abt.) 129.
3. Of my own publications I refer to: DER BEGRIFF DER GERECHTIGKEIT BEm ARISTOTELES,
published under the name Max Salomon (1937); Von den Dingen, die sich auch anders
verhalten k~nnen, 5 ARcHiv FOR PHILOSOPIE 305 ff.; Der Begriff des Naturrechts in der
Grossen Ethik, 41 ARCHLY FR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHiE 422 ff. This essay is
full of misprints and other mishaps, for I was, sorry to say, not given the opportunity to
read the proofs.
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these philological questions would be of considerable importance. They would
determine whether there was, in Aristotle's thought, a development toward
a deeper conception of the problem of natural law, corresponding to the de-
velopment of his insights in the realms of sociology and history.
Aristotle's authorship of the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics, and the
Rhetoric cannot reasonably be challenged. However, the same cannot be
said of the Magna Moralia. It has been argued by some that this work was
composed by a disciple either of Aristotle or possibly of Theophrastus. Others
regard Aristotle himself as the true author. These are moot questions4 not
yet answered to everyone's satisfaction; but whatever the ultimate answer may
be, the Magna Moralia exhibits the thought of Aristotle and his school. Hence
it is of utmost importance to examine thoroughly the treatment in the Magna
Moralia of the idea of justice and of the question of natural law. On certain
points there is a close affinity between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Magna
Moralia. For instance, one finds the problem of changeability and the ref-
erence to right-handed and ambidextrous people in both works. But the basic
meaning of the term "natural law" as used in the Magna Moralia differs fun-
damentally from that in the Nicomachean Ethics.
The doubtful authorship of the Magna Moralia may be the reason why
discussions of Aristotle's views on natural law center upon the Nicomachean
Ethics, the Politics, and the Rhetoric. This is a great mistake. Whether we
can attribute the Magna Moralia to Aristotle himself is, from a systematic
point of view, of little importance. For did not Socrates inform Charmides
that it is not as important to determine who said certain words as it is to de-
termine whether they are true or not? 5
Ignoring for the time being the purely philological problems of authen-
ticity, it is our aim to use the statements about natural law in the four texts
mentioned as a means to a better understanding of the complex problem of
natural law in particular and of justice in general. (The Eudemian Ethics, it
will be noted, does not make an independent contribution to the discussion.
The passages on justice found there are the same as those contained in the
Nicomachean Ethics.)
Having thus established the limits of our subject, we now begin the dis-
cussion of it.
2. As for the terminology in general, it cannot be denied that the term
&KatoI ObVo-LK'JV is more satisfactory than the more equivocal expression
4. See the most instructive work by SCHAECHER, STUDIEN ZU DEN ETHIKEN DES CORPUS
ARISTOTELICUM (1940); and the German translation of the Magna Moralia by Gohlke
(1951).
5. PLATO, CHARMIDES 161B.
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'natural law.' We make a clear statement when we say: "of justice part is
natural, part is legal." 6 Such a statement cannot easily be misunderstood; it
declares that the second part, namely, legal justice, is man-made justice. Con-
versely, it makes natural justice an eternally open question, unsolved and
maybe unsolvable. Because of the close affinity of 'legal' and 'law,' the term
'natural law' is more likely to be confounded with man-made law than the
term 'natural justice.' Also, at times it might be safer to approach the whole
problem of natural law in terms of whether a certain conduct accords with
natural justice. However, since the term 'natural law' is commonly used, we
shall follow the established tradition and speak, though with some hesitation,
about natural law and legal law.
Similar difficulties are inherent in the Greek term vo'lpog. To translate it
simply as 'law' leads to considerable misunderstanding. We would have to
stretch the meaning of 'law' unduly in order to arrive at the correct meaning
of the Greek term. The term v61og refers not only to what we commonly call
'law,' but also to the principles of customs, morals, manners and habits - to
everything which is a principle of order within, social life. Thus we read in
the Rhetoric7 that courage, as well as temperance and justice, is based on the
v4pos, and that they are in accord with the dictates of the v61o .8 The
votloT, so to speak, is at work wherever people submit to, and feel bound by,
propositions deciding the worthiness or unworthiness of a certain behavior
within a given community. Although the English language, too, uses the term
'law' in a fairly broad sense, encompassing the rules of nature as well as the
rules of games, it is still too restricted a concept to express the fullness of the
Greek v'/og. 'Norm,' on the other hand, is probably a more satisfactory
translation.
Whether such a norm is written or not is unimportant. The decisive char-
acteristic of a norm is that it is fixed (in some way) and enacted. Aristotle
repeatedly refers to the 'lawgiver,' the vo/LOOET7q. But when using this expres-
sion he does not have in mind the actual 'writer' or the author of a specific
norm. The voPzo6T-g is not a mythical entity either: he is quite simply that
authority which in the accepted sense has the power to lay down a norm.
This being so, our subsequent remarks will focus on the terms justice,
natural law, legal law, and norm.
6. E.N. 1134 b 18, translation by W. D. Ross.
7. Rh. 1366 b 10 ff.
8. eag 6 v61WS xeeidet.
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II
1. According to traditional opinion, Aristotle's 'true' meaning of natural
law has been laid down in unequivocal terms in the Rhetoric. Since it is never
advisable completely to ignore traditional views, let us consider whether we
have to read only the Rhetoric in order to understand Aristotle's conception
of natural law. The Rhetoric, to be sure, contains important references to
natural law, although the term itself is rarely used. It is here that we are told
that the law is either particular or general: 9 particular law is that law which
is applied by a particular state in administering justice; general law is that
law which, being acknowledged and recognized by everybody, is not confined
to a particular state. The latter is logically unwritten law.
This dualism is later examined 10 through the following two questions:
What is the special character of each of the two kinds of law? What does
each of them signify? We are told by way of a restatement of the previous
definition that particular law is restricted to the people who enacted it. Gen-
eral law is defined as that law which is Kara o'ov or 'according to nature.' I'
In this manner the term KaTa ovbirtv is introduced into the discussion of natu-
ral law. Once again we are confronted with the problem of written vs. un-
written in connection with all laws, whether particular or general. While it is
taken for granted that a general law can only be unwritten, a particular law
is described as being either written or unwritten. 12 In order to understand the
teachings of the Rhetoric great pains should be taken not to confuse general
with particular unwritten laws.
In the context of Aristotle's discussion in the Rhetoric the term 'unwritten
law' is used in at least four distinct ways:
(a) In human life as well as in theory there is always the possibility of
excess. It is here that we have to seek the distinction between virtue and
vice.13 How does the written law operate in such cases? The answer can
only be that it is silent; it does not envisage such a problem. Since we cannot
help trying to find a solution to the problems involved, we turn to unwritten
laws. But how do we explain that the written law, any written law, is not
capable of coping with these difficulties? The answer can only be that the
actions in question are not within the purview of written law.
In this connection the term 'law' has a dual meaning: a wider one ex-
pressed by the term of 'unwritten law,' and a more restricted one referred
9. &og - KotL6. Rh. 1368 b 8.
10. Rh. 1373 b 4.
11. Rh. 1373 b 6.
12. Rh. 1373 b 5.
13. Rh. 1374 a 21 ff.
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to by the term 'written law.' If this were not so, the unwritten law would
not be capable of facing a problem at the point where the written law must
fail by its own standards or limitations as a law. Evidently the meaning is (1)
that the action in question lies beyond the reaches of justice proper; (2) that
the unwritten law is a norm (as explained above) but not a law; and (3)
that it aims at moral, ethical, and possibly religious values or whatever takes
their place, but not at justice in the usual and more specific meaning of the
term. In order to understand these thoughts we may refer to the explicit dis-
tinction, found in the Nicomachean Ethics,1 4 between justice in a wider and
in a narrower sense. Justice in its comprehensive meaning knows only one
norm: to act and to behave like an honest and decent man - "honeste vi-
vere." This norm, whatever its content, cannot, of course, be written law.
The difference between written and unwritten laws is to be found not in
the way laws approach the reality they are supposed to control, but in the
system of values (of which justice is a member) which is applied to this real-
ity. Individual problems of evaluation themselves express the conditions for
applying the system or systems of values used in evaluation. As far as justice
itself is concerned this kind of unwritten law does not refer to justice at all,
unless - as is always possible - this term is stretched beyond its limits.
(b) In another connection 15 we learn, by way of an apparent anomaly,
that there is a kind of particular law that is supposed to be unwritten law.
Particular law, Aristotle restates here, 16 is a special agreement made by the
community and concerning that community; hence it is binding only upon
that particular community. But where a definite agreement exists, the law,
too, must be definite (or written). An unwritten (indefinite) law which has
expressly (definitely) been agreed upon is a contradiction in itself. Thus a law
is necessarily a written law if its source is a definite agreement. Aristotle, how-
ever, gives neither examples nor further explanations of particular unwritten
laws.
It is quite possible, therefore, that here he may have equity in mind. Only
the rule of equity is at the same time particular and general. Unwritten laws
in the form of particular laws would then play the same role as general laws
do in the entire realm of justice. At this point it is advisable to discuss Aris-
totle's concept of equity.
(c) Whenever Aristotle discusses equity at greater length he posits a
direct relation between equity and the unwritten law: written and unwritten
laws are no longer contrasted but are placed parallel to one another. It is
14. See DER BEGRIFF DER GERECHTIGKEIT BEi ARISTOTELES, cited supra, note 3 at 10 ff.
15. Rih. 1373 b 6.
16. Rh. 1374 b 19.
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clearly stated that equity is justice, but a justice "alongside" the written law
(To irap& rov ycypaLpe vov &KatoV).1'7 Now the word 'rapa does not have the
meaning of 'above' or 'against,' as it has often been rendered. Equity plays a
special role with regard to written laws by making up for the deficiencies or hu-
man shortcomings of the legislator. This recalls what we said before about the
personality of the 'legislator.'
One aspect of the legislator's deficiency can be accounted for as follows.
A legal term is used to refer to an indefinite number of situations, no two of
which are identical in all relevant aspects. A whole lifetime would not suf-
fice to enumerate these situations.' 8 Thus, a definition proposed for a legal
term by a legislator will in all likelihood fail to give precise limits to the appli-
cation of the term. Accordingly, either the need for new definitions will be
recognized 19 or the lawgiver will overlook the inadequacy of his proposals,
thinking that they will serve in all situations. In either event unanticipated
circumstances are bound to arise. Hence there must be something to make
up for this deficiency.
Reading the text of the Rhetoric up to this point, one can hardly see how
equity, called upon to fill an unavoidable gap in the written law, may be able
to tell us anything about natural law, which is obviously 'unwritten law.'
Problems arising from the practical application of the written law, however,
have to be met, we are advised, by the legislator. The spirit of the written
laws as well as the values they express should be honored and treated as a
guide. And the written laws should never be overturned. In this way no
'new' kind of justice will be created. Neither will anything be decided con-
trary to the fixed (or written) law. This is exactly what the idea of natural
law demands.
Thus far the concept of an unwritten law contributes little to our under-
standing of what natural law actually means. Aristotle, however, has still
more to say about equity. We know from practical experience that in certain
instances a specific conduct may be "illegal" and still be "equitable"; that is,
in accordance with the principles of justice and righteousness. In such cases
we should not adhere to the wording of the law, but look at the intentions of
the lawgiver and settle the dispute by "arbitration." Does this imply that le-
gal justice should be abolished and replaced by something else called "equity"?
Far from it. When we check Aristotle's statements we see quite another pic-
ture. No one has a right to be judged by any other standard than justice.
Hence Aristotle does not suggest that in certain cases the court should apply
17. Rh. 1374 a 25.
18. Rh. 1374 a 33.
19. Rh. 1374 a 27.
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"equity." He suggests that the plaintiff, the person or party whose legal rights
were infringed upon and, hence, who has an actionable claim (in the lan-
guage of the Nicomachean Ethics,2 0 he has -TOv V61Lov 8o-qo'v - he is backed
by justice) should renounce his rights and change from an aKpt/3o&KatOg to
aKptO,8o8' tos by putting reason above his legal right, equity above jus-
tice.21
The "norms" or "rules" of equity are not of the kind that could be writ-
ten down. That is their very essence. Here once more we encounter a form
of "unwritten law." But this kind of "unwritten law" is not natural law. Nor
does it help to solve the real problem of natural law.
(d) Previously we have used the expressions "particular law" and "gen-
eral law." In the Rhetoric,22 where the unwritten law is identified with nat-
ural law, these two terms are dealt with in more detail. Natural law exists
without an agreement, and it does not require any form of association.
The "general law," we are told, contains more justice and gives more
truth and expediency and accomplishes the work of the law better than its
counterpart, the written (or "particular") law.2 3 Being general, it does not
undergo any changes,2 4 while the written law frequently varies.2 5 These are
also the arguments, according to Aristotle, by which Antigone justifies her
disregard of Creon's order. Sophocles calls the law she follows 'eternal.'
In this context the terms "eternal" and "unchangeable" evidently mean
something not limited by territorial boundaries, not changing from country
to country. It is not immediately evident why the unwritten law should serve
justice better simply because it is not subject to change. On this point, how-
ever, the Rhetoric offers no further explanations. We shall see later that the
problem of changeability plays an important role in the discussions of natural
law in the Eudemian Ethics and in the Magna Moralia. Not being enforceable
by sanctions, the unwritten law is definitely at a disadvantage. 26 The question
of compulsion, on the other hand, is closely related to the questions of cer-
tainty and dependability. Thus for the 'higher' form of justice there is no
evidence in the form of a proof. The analogy with equity is not convincing.
The idea of an eternal, never changing law stirs our imagination and appeals
to our emotional feeling. This is not true, however, of the written law - the
rigidly strict norm, unmerciful in particular circumstances. But is it really
20. E.N. 1138 1 ff.
21. Rh. 1373 b 4.
22. KowLbV & 76P Ka ai &u . Rh. 1373 b 6.
23. eOs &uKator-pots. Rh. 1375 a 28.
24. del Jz'el Kal ov5roe AerapdXet. Rh. 1375 a 32.
25. VOXXdKLS. Rh. 1375 a 33.
26. g' dZ'YK17s. Rh. 1375 a 18.
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the task of justice to be merciful and accommodating? Only a truly philosoph-
ical or scientific approach can decide between the law based on fixed norms
and the law based on 'nature.'
2. So far, however, these questions cannot be fully answered. In order
to understand what Aristotle really says, his statements should not be read out
of context.
The method of the Rhetoric is, of course, bound to be scientific. Its con-
clusions obviously are not supposed to be aporiae or "fictions." Its subject,
however, is not science or ethics or anything of the kind. Neither the truth
of scientific statements nor the moral value of clearly defined actions is scien-
tifically explored here. For there is one thing that the Rhetoric definitely does
not do: it does not weigh values. Its aim is to demonstrate something quite
different, namely, the most efficient manner of 'persuasion' 27 in the interest
of certain ends which are taken for granted and are not examined in them-
selves. In themselves these ends are not necessarily related to scientific truth
or to moral values. No one knows better than Aristotle the difference, for in-
stance, between statesmanship and rhetoric. Merely to call attention to values
and value judgments without discussing or judging their merits is, for Aris-
totle, pure sophistry.
There are, Aristotle insists, five 'nontechnical' means of persuasion char-
acteristic of forensic oratory (where undoubtedly we have to deal with the
idea of justice). One of these is the laws, and others are witnesses, contracts,
torture, and oaths. Since we are actually confronted with a dual "set" of laws,
namely, fixed laws and unfixed laws, a forensic orator is faced with the alter-
native of invoking either the one or the other. But he cannot appeal to both
at the same time.
It might be helpful to translate the relevant paragraphs from the Rhetoric
into the language of our time.
"Students of the law or lawyers-to-be, if you wish to win your case in the
law courts, remind 'the jury' that it is their sacred duty to do justice - justice
and nothing else; that while giving their verdict in this particular case they
are serving the most sacred idea the world has ever known. When they are
thus truly impressed and are convinced that by their vote they decide the
fate of justice, then you may concentrate on your special case (up to this
point you cannot go wrong by using identical words and sentences). If the
law is in your favor, you must then argue that this sacred justice rests on
nothing else but the law which is open to everyone's inspection and verifica-
tion, as well as on the respect towards the wisdom and greatness of the rules
27. Rh. 1355 b 27.
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that have been transmitted to us by our forefathers or promulgated by a wise
and impartial government. How can anyone be permitted to trifle with such
institutions! 28 However, should the law be against your client's case, then
plead exactly the other way round, 29 but still display the same air of convic-
tion: stress the insufficiency and the logical limitations of statements contained
in rigid generalities, and their inability to cope adequately with the unforsee-
able complexity of the concrete problem at issue. Whatever your case may be,
this leads you immediately to claim that the jurors cannot but decide in your
favor, adhering alternatively to the fixed law or to the natural law. And al-
ways, of course, to the yvd4l 7 dplo'T71. 30 In both instances you appear
clearly to act as the devoted and humble servant of justice whose plea is mo-
tivated solely by his love of justice and nothing else. But in both instances
your arguments make justice a servant of your particular interests. This is the
best way to win your case."
We may also transfer this advice from law to politics, from how to win
a legal argument to how to win an election. If the candidate belongs to the
party in power, one would argue that the existing tradition has stood the test,
that there is an inherent danger in new experiments, and that there is a duty
to repay faith by faith. From the other side we would hear about the danger
of permitting a situation to stagnate, and about the desirability of electing new
people with new ideas. The campaign motto would be: "It is time for a
change." Such slogans are known to everyone. This raises the question: Are
the speech writers concerned with truth or are they merely interested in ef-
fective campaign oratory? To what extent is the sociologist who describes
effective oratory concerned with the rightness or wrongness of such oratory?
These examples are designed to illustrate, by the use of modern terms, the
teachings of the Rhetoric. Aristotle, to be sure, was not discussing the moral-
ity of such arguments. He merely revealed the weakness of human emotions
and, what is even more relevant, how this weakness can be exploited. Un-
doubtedly, people want to win lawsuits or electoral contests. It is no secret
that certain procedures help and others do harm. If we intend to study the
reactions to rhetorical methods, we should be candid.
Aristotle knew that some persons held certain views about natural law,
and that others held diametrically opposed views. The Rhetoric, however,
does not prove or even discuss the validity of either of the opposed positions.
The allusions to natural law in the Rhetoriq neither estimate its moral value
nor establish the relationship of "legal" law to natural law. Hence these allu-
28. o rap& ,bv P6,oy 8&Kd~etp. Rh. 1375 a 30.
29. A ,rarreXCs Xp 4a6at tois -yeypapqzvot. Rh. 1375 a 30.
30. Cf. Lipsius, 1 DAS ATTISCHE REcHT UND RECHTSVERFAHREN 152 (1905).
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sions cannot possibly contain Aristotle's 'real' views on natural law. The aim
of the Rhetoric, in regard to natural law, is to show that the term natural law
is in vogue and that from a certain point of view it is considered an advan-
tage to make use of its emotional appeal.
To sum up: In the Rhetoric Aristotle intends neither to assert nor to
prove that the natural law holds any kind of superior position. No judgment
is passed on natural law. He merely introduces us to a catchword without
discussing its moral significance. Hence what he says here is neither an exal-
tation nor a depreciation of natural law.
III
1. "Insofar as law is not 'by nature' but is merely human enactment it is
not the same everywhere. It is not even the case with regard to constitutions
that they are everywhere the same, though there is only one constitution which
is - by nature - everywhere the best." 31 This is the last sentence of the
chapter on natural law contained in the Nichomachean Ethics. Here natural law
plays the role of deciding questions of justice and, in so doing, it also judges
the law that is actually in force. Now we can readily understand why Aris-
totle's authority is traditionally called upon to defend, and to glorify, the idea
of natural law. The sentence quoted above contains the term -q &pirai (the
best) .32 Aristotle does not use such predicates as 'useful' or 'recommendable'
or 'most serviceable'; neither does he call "the best constitution" 'right' or
'correct.' The term 47 dpto-r7 assigns the statement to the realm of ethics or
ethical judgments. The most important parts of the Politics, like those of the
Nicomachean Ethics, are based on ethical valuations. The term 7 dpto'r has
the same ethical meaning in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics as it has
in the Eudemian Ethics, a fact which closely relates these works.33 The teach-
ings of the Politics - and the same applies to the Nicomachean Ethics - do
not aim at mere descriptions, except where we are presented with a collection
of facts which are necessary to demonstrate how at different times certain
problems have been dealt with. Politics and ethics are sciences, or to be more
exact, axiomatic sciences defining, by the use of a scientific method of judg-
ments and values, what should be and ought to be; what is bad and what is
good. Hence the above sentence merely tells us what kind of constitution is
the best according to the science of ethics.
There are many different constitutions which do not measure up to the
31. E.N. 1135 a 3-5.
32. E.N. 1135 a 5.
33. E.N. 1181 b 13 ff.
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standard of "the best." Nevertheless, they are enforced as well as binding
upon the citizens. This, we are told, is in conflict with the fact that general
laws of nature must be, and are, everywhere the same. "Fire burns in exactly
the same way in Persia as in other countries." 34 Hence in contrast to the
laws of (physical) nature, legal laws may be valid but not in force, or in
force but not valid (validity being a characteristic quality of natural law).
The distinction between "being in force" and "being valid" is one between
two different spheres of spiritual being. The key to this problem can be found
in the use of the term Ocr &, in the Nicomachean Ethics. When we call a con-
stitution "the best" - that is, when we declare it valid whether in force or not
- we must realize that "being in force" and "being valid" have nothing to do
with each other. A single law may have both of these properties or it may
have one and lack the other; but this does not affect the properties themselves.
'Nature' belongs to another plane. What is valid by nature may actually be
in force; but this "being in force" might be merely accidental.
When we select a single constitution and assert that it is the best of all
constitutions, past and present, real or imaginary, then the other constitutions
are not only not the best: they are bad, inferior, poor or whatever other value
we wish to assign to them. It may be possible to show higher or lower de-
grees of adequacy. We see in the Politics that a bad form of government is
always considered a perversion of the good form of government and, accord-
ingly, opposed by the latter.3 5 According to the more elaborate and evidently
later teachings of the Nicomachean Ethics, it should not be difficult to indi-
cate at least two contrasting "forms" opposed to the good "form" and, also,
opposed to each other as "too much" 36 and "too little." 37 The good "form,"
it may be maintained, is the mean between two evils, or perhaps better, be-
tween two imperfect forms. We know that the problems of politics arise out
of the problems of ethics. The judgment we pass on constitutions is "science"
in the same way as moral teaching is science. But whereas it is not difficult
to show, e.g., that liberality 38 is the mean between prodigality and meanness,
and pride3 9 the mean between vanity and humility, the definition of the "best
government" offers some difficulty. The proof of what is the best government
sometimes relies on the magic word "nature," or, as in the Politics, employs
as a criterion the "common good," 40 without, however, linking this "common
good" to "nature."
34. E.N. 1134 b 26.
35. Pol. 1279 a 23 ff.
36. breppoXi. E.N. 1108 b 12.
37. etX4p,&. E.N. 1108 b 12.
38. E.N. 1119 b 21 ff.
39. E.N. 1123 a 33 ff.
40. Pol. 1279 a 30.
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According to the Nicomachean Ethics, one can demonstrate which kind
of constitution is best. But the same cannot be said for the examples which
Aristotle gives for law that is "not natural." 4 1 There is no way of deciding
whether the rites for certain offerings should be a goat or two sheep. Or what
the ransom should amount to. Here we have nothing like the 'best' solution.
The "nonnatural" (or "legal") law is referred to by a variety of names
and descriptions: it is "not by nature" ;42 "promulgated" ;43 "based on agree-
ment4 4 and convenience" ;45 or "merely human." 4 6 What is called "promul-
gated law" is that law which could possibly have been quite different.47 Be-
fore it was promulgated, 48 there were several alternatives as to how this law
might read.4 9 But once promulgated,50 it is "fixed." Thus we distinguish
between the law that has actually been promulgated and the law that might
have been promulgated.
. This last description is the most important. But did not Aristotle mention
changeability as a criterion of nonnatural law? It is mentioned 51 only to be
denied the status of an essential characteristic. Promulgated law, to be sure,
changes. But natural law may also change. Hence, seen from this point of
view, no conspicuous difference exists between natural law and "nonnatural"
law. However, the reasons for change in each kind of law differ. Therefore,
when we see that laws undergo changes, this in itself does not indicate whether
they are or are not "according to nature." The characteristic of changeabil-
ity cannot be our criterion, although in itself natural law is aKLrV7)oV - un-
changeable.
5 2
In coniection with this argument of changeability, reference is made to
the example of people becoming ambidextrous. 53 Even if every right-handed
person learned to use the left hand with the same efficiency as the right hand,
it would still be correct, Aristotle contends, to say that the right hand is
"by nature" stronger than the left hand. It is hard to understand what this
example means and what it is supposed to prove. The statement that even in
the case of ambidextrous people the right hand is "by nature" (o-et)
stronger than the left hand is discussed at length and more clearly in the
41. E.N. 1134 b 21 f.
42. -r& jj OcVd. E.N. 1135 a 3.
43. 67av U O&oprat. E.N. 1134 b 21.
44. rb 8oKeC j A. E. N. 1134 b 20.
45. T& U KC ,or 0UV,0jKev. E.N. 1134 b 35, 1134 b 32.
46. di'6pcbrwa. E.N. 1135 a 4.
47. o0868 8aupet. E.N. 1134 b 21.
48. ZE dpXjs. E.N. 1134 b 20.
49. orrws j dUwXX. E.N. 1134 b 21.
50. 5mozpe,. E.N. 1134 b 21.
51. E.N. 1134 b 25 ff.
52. E.N. 1134 b 25.
53. E.N. 1134 b 34 ff.
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Magna Moralia.54 There we are told the significance of the statement, "a
possible change does not necessarily affect what is 'in accordance with' (or
'by') nature." But this is true only if the expression "according to nature" is
used in the sense given it in the Magna Moralia, where its meaning is quite
different from that found in the Nicomachean Ethics. The Magna Moralia
holds that being "according to nature" means to be generally valid and not
merely temporarily so. To become ambidextrous or to become left-handed
does not change what is "according to nature," namely, the greater strength
of the right hand. We may assume that this illustration, if not directly taken
from the Magna Moralia, has been used by Aristotle's successors when they
discussed the problem of the changeability of the natural law. It is also pos-
sible that the reference to this illustration was carried over into the On'o-tq-
notion of the Nicomachean Ethics without being adapted to the profounder
meaning it acquired there. In any case, all these discussions fail to shed any
light on the real meaning of natural law in the Nicomachean Ethics.
We have already seen that the &,KaoV VO!UKOV cannot be proved in the
same way as the &tKaLov Obvo-uK4v can be proved. On the other hand, an
enacted law could very well have been one way or another, something which
is not true of a constitution. In addition, it is not true that all enacted laws,
no matter what their subject may be, can be adjusted and improved to such a
degree that they become natural laws. The enacted law is characterized by
its original indifference towards its content - oro0) 3 AXXcoq, whereas nat-
ural law from the beginnning aims at being 'the best.'
2. The difference between &iKatov ovoKOV and &LKatov V0o.LKOv does
not arise because of human limitations; hence it cannot be overcome by
greater efforts to grasp the truth. There are always good and bad constitu-
tions; but they are good or bad "according to nature." The difference between
a good and a bad constitution is not so great as that between laws which can
be good or bad by nature and those which cannot be evaluated according to
nature. This appears to be the central problem of Aristotle's theory in the
Nicomachean Ethics: the difference between enacted law and natural law
does not lie in the fact that the former gives the right and the latter gives the
wrong solution to the same legal problem. This is the usual but erroneous in-
terpretation of the difference between enacted and natural law. However, this
difference is related to structural differences between the problems appropriate
to each. A law which has the character of a natural law is different from the
"mere human" law, not because the latter may be wrong "according to na-
ture," but because the "human" law deals with a problem concerning which
54. See infra, IV.
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it makes no sense to ask for a solution based on nature. If a legal problem
does not belong to the sphere of natural law, no conceivable effort can invest
the solution with validity "according to nature." Thus the difference between
two sets, not of answers, but of potential laws is the difference of the highest
importance, although it has not yet been taken into full account.
Once the easily misleading argument from changeability has been re-
moved, it remains to point out that natural law and human law differ in re-
spect to the Sivajzug. 55 Natural law has everywhere the same &;val.ts: mere
human law has not.
The meaning of the term is not readily understood because it is not ex-
plained in this context and is, in itself, ambiguous. We read in the Nicoma-
chean Ethics5 6 that the two kinds of justice - natural law and human law -
are alike in that both are directed irpO' O'mpov, 57 and this property is called
their 8Uva.ug. This word is evidently used to point out one of their character-
istics and essential qualities. We learn in the Metaphysics that the primary
material is unchangeable 9K Tr8p Svvd4LEo& rn aro. 5 s We may presume
that by claiming the same &Uval t everywhere for natural law, the word is
being used metaphorically5 9 in a more pregnant sense than it could have in
connection with, e.g., geometry. It indicates a norm60 immanent in things
themselves, a norm which is not dependent upon human discretion.
Natural law has everywhere the same SUvap.w; the mere human law
could with equal propriety be different. Therefore, natural law is not cap-
able of being different than it is; mere human law does not have everywhere
the same 86a/zL.
Things are either capable or not capable of being different than they are;
tertium non datur. This idea is found in all the teachings of Aristotle. This
may be the reason why no special explanation of it is given in the chapter
on natural law, where, as we see, it plays a decisive role. However, the idea
is dealt with in a later chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics.6 1 In this descrip-
tion we find what Aristotle means by justice based on O6 L1. Things that
are capable of being other than they are,62 are excluded as subjects of scien-
tific knowledge. 63 Only the necessary can be a subject of scientific knowl-
55. E.N. 1134 b 19, 26.
56. See infra.
57. E.N. 1134 b 1.
58. M. 1014 b 28.
59. M. 1019 b 33, 1046 a 7.
60. M. 1078 a 28.
61. E.N. 1139 a 8 ff.
62. r p CxoP.vUoW Kal &XXW 9XGw. E.N. 1134 b 31.
63. An. Pr. 88 b 32 ff.
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edge. 6 4 Necessity is limited to things that cannot be otherwise,6 5 or, from
another point of view, it is limited to things whose basis and essence are not
capable of being otherwise. 66 We can trace this dividing line even in the
doctrine of essential and nonessential accidents. There can be demonstrative
knowledge of essential accidents, but not of nonessential accidents.
6 7
And so the doctrine of natural law is a science; its methods are the meth-
ods of a science. The doctrine of the other kind of justice has neither the
dignity nor the rigor of a science; and its methods must be nonscientific.
This description of the doctrine of nonnatural law is negative. We have,
however, other descriptions which are definitely positive. Only things that
are capable of being other than they are permit reflection, deliberation, and
decision. 68 Only in this area may questions be settled arbitrarily. In the field
of science this is not true. Mathematics and physics do not allow decisions.
We cannot deliberate on whether or not the angles of the triangle should be
equal to two right angles 6 9 or if the diagonal of the quadrangle should be
commensurable. 7 0 In this respect there is no room for resolution and decision,
but only for recognition and proof. The same applies, as should be stressed
at once, to the field of history. Concerning whether or not Troy has been de-
stroyed, no decision is possible. 1 Things of the past are not capable of being
otherwise. Insofar even the gods are bound.
7 2
Accordingly, we can only recognize, but not decide upon, laws in force at
a previous time or at present. In this respect we are faced by facts which we
ourselves cannot change or influence. However, what the provisions of spe-
cific nonnatural law should be is not something for mere recognition but, on
the other hand, requires reflection, deliberation, and decision.
3. The examples of mere human law in the Nicomachean Ethics (amount
of the ransom, rites of sacrifices) are not representative of all nonnatural law.
Natural law is not involved when rules are given for a singular and isolated
case or when a plebiscite is involved. 73 The word "plebiscite" does not con-
vey Aristotle's meaning precisely: qnbOt"ara are norms put into force on
the spur of the moment, without due deliberation and without a full exami-
nation of their universal application. It is evident that such human laws are
64. E.N. 1140 b 32.
65. M. 1026 a 27 ff.
66. E.N. 1139 a 8.
67. An. Pr. 75 a 18.
68. Rh. 1357 a 6. Cf. E.N. 1112 a 19 ff.
69. See, for instance, E.N. 1140 b 26.
70. See, for instance, M. 1019 b 26.
71. E.N. 1139 b 8.
72. E.N. 1139 b 10.
73. E.N. 1134 b 23.
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different from the previous ones. The lesson is clear. Natural law is not a
law outside or beyond justice. Before a norm can be considered either a
natural or a human law it must satisfy the conditions of justice as a whole. 74
Human justice is not a disfiguration of justice waiting to be corrected and
improved by natural law. Human justice is justice - only not of the same
kind as natural law.
And so there are certain conditions that must be fulfilled if a norm, be it
natural or human, is to be a norm of justice, of justice proper and not of
other ideas no matter how exalted. One essential characteristic of justice as a
whole is its universality. 7 5 We always have a general rule76 on the one hand
and an infinite number of cases 77 falling under this rule on the other. This
statement, of such high importance for the fundamentals of justice, occurs in
the text of the Nicomachean Ethics without any visible link to the chapter on
natural law. It can be understood only as an explanation of the previous ob-
servation that rules referring to only a single case cannot be taken as rules of
justice. The honors accorded Brasidas78 are outside the area of natural law,
not because Aristotle disapproves of this commemoration or because he re-
jects deification in general (nothing of this kind is hinted at) but because the
corresponding regulations do not belong to the realm of justice at all, whatever
their aims may be. With regard to qIgnq'14Lara, the position of Aristotle is
well defined.
7 9
From all this it would follow that natural law is not present (a) where
the answer to a problem depends upon our free moral decision and, hence,
cannot be supplied by scientific proof; and (b) where no rule of a general
character is involved.
Similarly, where there is no general rule there is no justice. We are ap-
proaching what can be called a general theory of justice or jurisprudence. Its
role is to determine what the conditions and presuppositions are for a norm
to be a norm of justice in the strict sense. When we set out to answer this ques-
tion we are aware that it is not offered for our personal deliberations. We
cannot decide at will if the limits of justice should be so or otherwise; what
we have to do is to recognize them. We are in this respect exploring the "a
priori" of justice.
Even though the problems relating to the "a priori" of justice are of a
scientific character and would seem, therefore, to be confined to the area of
74. E.N. 1134 b 18.
75. KaO6Xov. E.N. 1135 a 8.
76. '9KoTOP '4p. E.N. 1135 a 8.
77. T& . . . rparr6Aeva ,roXXd. E.N. 1135 a 7.
78. E.N. 1134 b 23.
79. Pol. 1292 a 20.
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natural law, this is not the case. We must, however, realize that the term
"natural law" is too often stretched in its application to the theory of the "a
priori" of justice. Whether or not this is done, the fact remains that the sub-
ject of these problems is in any case completely different. In the language of
Aristotle, the "a priori" of justice is called &tKatov a1rXcj. 8 0 The natural law
does not pass judgment on the human law, for only something above both
kinds of justice can do this.
The doctrine of the "a priori" of justice seeks to bring the foundations of
justice to light, to show the premises of what is just. It neither tries nor is able
to provide concrete answers to practical questions. It does not produce the
'best' solution to a specific legal problem, e.g., that of the best constitution.
This is, so to speak, the curse of the theory; it appears 'useless' from a prac-
tical point of view, and it will always be neglected for just this reason. Ex-
actly the same applies, however, to the theory of natural law as presented in
the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle does not teach us how to prove that a law
is a natural law, e.g., how to deduce the 'best' government from the higher
principle and so to demonstrate that it is really the best. He follows the ap-
proach he uses to best advantage in all his teachings of ethics. He attempts
to arouse in us a feeling for values and their quality, taking as a standard
the honest and esteemed citizen of his age.
Accordingly, when he refers to natural law in his various writings he goes
beyond mere formal declarations. He prefers here, as always, to show his
methods in actual operation. An example of this is his observation that there
are slaves by nature and slaves by mere norms.8 1 Other examples are pre-
sented in the introductory remarks to the Politics: man is dependent on com-
munity life,8 2 the home community is a natural frame for daily life,8 3 the
state is 'prior' 84 to individual men and the home.8 5 All these propositions are
clearly based on deductions from natural law. The same can be said for his
observations about men's striving after knowledge,8 6 or the fact that 'imita-
tion' 87 is natural to man, or that he who confers a benefit 8 8 feels more at-
tached to the receiver than vice versa. In all of these statements we are re-
ferred to 4lo-tq as the explanation. Our insights into what can be proved and
what cannot be proved will always change. Likewise, we can never know all
80. See DER BEGRIFF DER GERECHTIGKEIT BEi ARISTOTELES, cited supra, note 3 at 117 ff.
81. Pol. 1255 a 5.
82. Pol. 1253 a 2.
83. Pol. 1252 b 13.
84. C. 14 a 26- 14 b 22.
85. Pol. 1253 a 19.
86. M. 980 a 21.
87. Poe. 1448 b 5. "Imitation" is the usual but not the correct translation ot /tIApats.
88. E.E. 1241 a 40.
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the conclusions which may be deduced from propositions established by nat-
ural law as "the best." It is obvious that by accepting a certain constitution
as the best, the aspects of justice and the corresponding laws inherent in such
a constitution are, to a high degree, fixed by mere logic.8 9 But apart from
this, whatever our human shortcomings in grasping and recognizing the truth,
the fact still remains that there are two kinds of justice. It is a scientific truth
that a line of division may be drawn between a law that can be proved and
a law that cannot be proved but which bases its validity on nothing but an
act of promulgation.
There will, of course, always be doubts as to whether a proposition de-
clared to be a natural law will stand the test. We come, e.g., across the dogma
that a certain kind of war is qVa-eft &Kcov.90 This 'deduction' may be cor-
rect. It depends upon another proposition of natural law to the effect that
there are people created to render services similar to those of animals. These
people are, therefore, meant to be slaves, and if they do not realize the 'truth'
of this verdict and do not accept it, then they have to be shown their actual
position by way of war. One is tempted to recall a remark of Heine, that it
all depends on the proof of the statement that some men are born with sad-
dles on their back, some with spurs on their feet.
4. There remains the question: What governs the laws which may be
oTrwo 7 ' Mo0g? Regardless of their content, once they are promulgated, they
are in force. The alternative solutions which might have been promulgated
are of possible historical value but otherwise insignificant. So what is the jus-
tification for the provision actually chosen and promulgated?
One possible answer is that after a specific norm has become law it is
'proved' to be "the best" according to Aristotle's meaning, i.e., the best from
a moral point of view according to a scientific proof. This would mean that
originally the dictum of the law was not capable of being other than as it is
and, hence, the law would not be of the kind we are presently considering.
Such a 'proof,' accordingly, cannot be accepted.
In the chapter on natural law in the Nicomachean Ethics there is a hint
of an answer to our question. We are told that we make use of large weights
in buying wholesale quantities and smaller weights in the retail business; this
evidently is the meaning of the passage involved, written in connection with
the problem of changeability. 9 1 This variability in the use of weights also
characterizes norm-laws. Both weights and norm-laws are based on conven-
89. See DER BEGRIFF DER GERECHTIGKEIT BEI ARISTOTELES, cited supra, note 3 at 119 ff.
90. Pol. 1256 b 26.
91. E.N. 1135 a 1 ff.
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tion. 92 This reference to convention is not new; that norm-laws are charac-
terized by this notion was mentioned before. Now, however, the rules of
changing weights are related to the idea of usefulness 93 as well. The link
drawn at this point between norm-law and usefulness does not explain much,
just as the reference to the common-best 94 gives no help. It may be difficult
to see in this remark the germ of a theory on how laws should be enacted
when they do not belong to the sphere of natural laws.
Usefulness and "the best" always remain in different worlds. Natural law
may mean the right solution of a problem wrongly solved by existing norms;
in this case the right and the wrong solutions of an identical problem confront
each other. In this case the existence of two different solutions to the same
problem indicate the existence of a wrong and a right (or less wrong) natural
law solution. There is always an antithesis between solutions based on sci-
entific proof and solutions based on some other principle, possibly the prin-
ciple of usefulness.
As we have seen, Aristotle is dealing with questions of jurisprudence. We
should not blame him if a critique of lawgiving is not included in his essay.
The whole Book E of the Nicomachean Ethics is designed as a discussion of
justice as a virtue, in the same way that courage, temperance, or friendliness,
for example, is a virtue. It is only by way of an appendix that attention is
transferred from the subjective factors of human behavior to the objective
conditions of justice, as incorporated in laws valid for a human community.
5. If we can accept Aristotle's insight into the difference between laws
which can be proved (because they concern that which is not capable of
being other than it is) and laws which are merely in force (because their con-
tent is capable of being other than it is) as being a lasting achievement of
our scientific knowledge, then we cannot avoid the question as to whether
there is a like distinction in other spheres of human relationship such as friend-
ship, love, worship, comradeship, and partnership. According to Aristotle
cftta 95 and justice refer to the same persons and to the same objects. So it
might be worthwhile to analyze the term 0AI'a and to investigate various re-
lationships between man and man other than those belonging to the category
of justice.9 6 We might be able to demonstrate that in all social intercourse
the same distinction is present. Here, too, there are things that can be proved
92. Ka& UPV8KOEP. E.N. 1134 b 35.
93. rb oi-6,bepo,. E.N. 1134 b 35.
94. Pol. 1279 b 9.
95. E.N. 1159 b 25.
96. See my book, DAS SITTLICHE VERHALTEN ZUM MITMENSCHEN, IM ANSCHLUSS AN
ARISTOTELES (1958).
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valid scientifically and things for which deviations from rules are to be ex-
pected. Aristotle himself limits his ideas about natural law to justice.
The difficulties, of course, would be exactly the same as we encountered
before. The scientific proof is dependent on the methods of ethics. These
methods are not easy to describe and are even less easy to apply. There will
always be people lacking what Nietzsche calls intellectual honesty 97 who will
"prove" the norms which, for reasons of their own, they wish to have en-
forced. In so doing they ignore the fact that since these norms could easily
be quite different, their "proofs" are a matter of discretionary decision rather
than conclusive evidence.
Finally, there is one highly important question which Aristotle does not
consider, the question of convictions and moral judgments transmitted from
generation to generation, varying from country to country and adapted to the
special aspects of the epoch. When working on a problem of (real) natural
law we may always start ab ovo. In order to find the 'best' answer, we may
not - or should not - be influenced by the contemporary solutions given
to the problem involved. On the other hand, if we are to find a just solution
to a problem in the realm of things which can be other than they are, we
should not set aside contemporary solutions. Here, what is called 'common
law' guides the application and evolution of justice.
This hint may suffice. Our aim is neither to decide upon the merits of
natural law itself nor upon its limits, but only to discover the ideas which are
explicit or implicit in Aristotle's teachings on this topic.
IV
1. We turn now to the Magna Moralia. Here again we find, in the chap-
ters dealing with the problem of justice, the term 4oCEt &iKatov. Here the
meaning of this term differs completely from that in the Rhetoric and the
Nicomachean Ethics. It is neither a slogan of propaganda nor an appeal to
science and scientific proof. Rather, it acquaints us with another problem, a
problem presented to us unavoidably by the idea of justice, or, more exactly,
by our way of practicing justice.
It might be advisable to give a translation of the key passage. 98 The sen-
tences, as Aristotle wrote them, are often no more than mere catch phrases
and must be supplemented (as shown in the brackets) in order to be fully
understood.
97. "Intellektuelle Rechtschaffenheit."
98. M.M. 1194 b 30-1195 a 8.
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[What is called] justice is partly by nature, partly by statute. We must
not think that [if there is anything like justice by nature at all] no change
of it is feasible. [Quite generally speaking] what is by nature is [against
convictions widely in vogue] liable to changes. I mean this: if we should
all begin throwing with the left hand we would become ambidextrous; but
even then the left hand remains the left hand, and the right hand is
nevertheless superior to the left hand. You can disregard our succeeding
to accomplish everything with the left in the same way as with the right
hand. [So we see that in this respect we are allowed to disregard actual
changes.] What is exposed to possible changes is not for this reason
[already] opposed to its being by nature. Rather, when - as in most cases
and for the greatest length of time - the left hand remains the left [usu-
ally that means the weaker] hand, and the right hand remains the right
[usually that means the stronger] hand, then we have something that is by
nature.
Matters are exactly the same with justice by nature; when there are
changes in consequence of our way of handling it [that is, of our way of
putting justice into practice] then such a change does not transform the
original law into a law 'not by nature.' It remains, rather, what it is
[namely, justice by nature]. For what prevails generally is obviously jus-
tice by nature.
On the other hand, what we lay down and promulgate as statutes is
[no doubt] justice; but it is this only in consequence of our doing so, and
we call it justice by statute, but what we are looking for [in our present
treatise] is justice in the sense of public law, and this public law is based
on statutes and not on nature. [Therefore, we do not include natural law
in our discussions.]
In one respect this description coincides with the main thesis of the Nicoma-
chean Ethics: natural law and legal law represent two different kinds of law,
separated by an unbridgeable gap. Legal law is based on promulgation. Ac-
cording to the Nicomachean Ethics, there is a chance that natural law will be
accepted as legal law and will accordingly be promulgated. Here in the Mag-
na Moralia a promulgated natural law is itself a contradiction. This is a first
indication that natural law in the Magna Moralia does not deal with the same
problem we encountered in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric.
In the Magna Moralia natural law is recognized as justice (of a certain
kind) and is characterized as being in actual use, despite its incompatibility
with promulgation. It is in use not here and there and from time to time,
but for a certain duration of time and as an accepted rule.
At the start of the discussion we are told that the distinction between legal
law and natural law is not to be found in a difference with regard to the pos-
sibility of change. We saw in the Nicomachean Ethics that the question of
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changeability played a large part in the debates in which Aristotle participated.
Whenever justice and sbiros were brought into a positive connection, one
was always told that cno-V, may be a cause of movement, but cannot be
moved and changed itself. It is exempt from alteration. However, what is
called justice based on 0/nortq is, like any other kind of law, given to changes,
as is evident. Therefore, the expression o'ot 8Katov cannot embody the
meaning of the term 0n'o-tT; and so it is misleading to maintain that there
is something like a natural law. The battle against the importance of natural
law might well have been conducted in this way.
This may be the reason why, even before any serious demonstration takes
place, great pains are taken in the Magna Moralia to straighten out this dif-
ficulty. This is done in a straightforward way: 4no-g, we are told, has not
the meaning of being unmoveable, at least not here in the discussion of justice
and law. "What prevails generally, that is, what is based on nature" (gener-
ally, and so by nature)9 9 is "what is valid in most cases and for the greatest
length of time." 100 Such a change in the meaning of 'being by nature' gives
us a completely different outlook and brings us face to face with new prob-
lems. These new problems are rendered even more difficult by the quite sur-
prising remark at the end of the text, as quoted above, that natural law can-
not and will not be dealt with in the Magna Moralia.10 1 It is decisively ex-
cluded as a potential topic. Accordingly, it is not mentioned anywhere else
in the Magna Moralia. We must be satisfied with the few remarks we have
seen. But we cannot leave it at this time since the problem of natural law has
been raised under such different circumstances, and also because of the declar-
ation that natural law is 'superior' to legal law.
10 2
2. Why this exclusion of natural law from the discussion in the Magna
Moralia? Not for any reason connected with its being 'natural.' Rather, the
reason is that it is not deemed to be justice at all in the meaning this term has
in the Magna Moralia. We saw this before while discussing the Nicomachean
Ethics. Unless a norm belongs to the sphere of justice, it cannot be a natural
law. The problem of natural law lies outside the kind of specific law that is
discussed in the Magna Moralia; and as the inquiry, we are told, is not to be
extended to any outside norm, it has no place in the Magna Moralia.
At this point there is a decisive discrepancy between the Magna Moralia
and the Nicomachean Ethics. Both books agree in that they contrast natural
law and legal law. But in the Nicomachean Ethics natural law and legal law
99. r ',p CIP 69C Tb IroX bLa/zgpoY 7o6o 060-C& BlKao, rrpo~avg. M.M. 1195 a 3.
100. ,rb r ,roX Kai rbv 7rXelw Xp6PoP. M.M. 1194 b 35.
101. M.M. 1195 a 7.
102. PAirtov. M.M. 1195 a 6.
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are parts of public justice (ro i roXvrK6o &Kaov),103 while in the Magna
Moralia natural law and legal law are parts of justice (7djv &Kaouov).104 This
places natural law in one case within, in the other case without, public jus-
tice. Whether or not natural law is a part of public justice is not a superficial
question. It is not merely a question of good or bad arrangement. In order
to understand this we have to begin further back.
As in the Nicomachean Ethics,'0 5 the chapter on justice in the Magna
Moraliai'0 6 begins with the statement that there are two kinds of justice. It
would be better to say that the word 'justice' has two meanings.
On the one hand the term characterizes a certain kind of behavior de-
scribed as the acme of virtue.1 0 7 The Nicomachean Ethics"08 goes one step
further in this respect by adding the view that although it is the totality of
virtue, it is such a totality only insofar as "directed towards fellowmen." It is
therefore something more, or even other than, the sum of all the individual
virtues. However, the Magna Moralia speaks only about a relationship KaO"
eavr6v,,1° 9 as it is specific for virtue as a whole. In this way justice is confined
to an amalgam of facts previously discovered in the analysis of the various
virtues. This difference, however, does not matter here. The main point is
that justice in this first sense is a definite attitude in our life, and this attitude
is measured by conformity with, or deviation from, the V05/o.,0i ° To act in
conformity with the law is to act justly;"' to act contrary to it is to act un-
justly. Considering the far-reaching meaning of v,40t, already mentioned
above, it should not be overlooked that there is no direct connection between
this kind of justice and either the ethical good called justice or legal law,
judges, lawcourts and the like. Thus, in discussing natural law, consideration
of a special kind of human character is of no assistance. Natural law cannot
be explained as originating in human E .
Another meaning of justice, recognized" i 2 in both works as directed
iTpoq 7&epov, is equality."i 3 In the Magna Moralia, for example, it is said
that justice is equality and equality is justice."l 4 It may be equality of quan-
103. E.N. 1134 b 18.
104. M.M. 1194 b 30.
105. E.N. 1129 a 26.
106. M.M. 1193 b 2.
107. M.M. 1193 b 6.
108. E.N. 1129 b 26.
109. M.M. 1193 b 13.
110. M.M. 1193 b 2.
111. G. C. Armstrong, in his translation of M.M., misses the decisive point by calling
P6puos a legal law: ,61Aos, it will be noticed, remains outside the sphere of both natural
law and legal law.
112. M.M. 1193 b 19.
113. M.M. 1193 b 20.
114. M.M. 1193 b 33.
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tity or of quality,1 15 but it is in any case something that can be measured in
a strictly mathematical sense. In this respect justice means something quite
different from justice as the mark of a particular person, state of mind, or vir-
tue. Justice in this respect is a principle, a rule, or a moral value.
It should not seem strange that, as explained in the Magna Moralia, and
in more detail in the Nicomachean Ethics, the term 'justice' has a double
meaning, especially if we consider that in everyday English usage it has the
same double meaning. English 'justice' may mean a virtue as well as "the
just" and lawful. In this respect the German language is substantially the
same, since the term 'Gerechtigkeit'. can be applied both to a characteristic
of any individual who is gerecht and to anything denoted by the noun "Recht.'
The Nicomachean Ethics 116 contains the important assertion that all that is
lawful (justice in the first sense) is just (justice in the second sense), while
not all that is just is lawful. Such an assertion is missing in the Magna Mor-
alia, yet it would not have been incompatible with the teaching of the Magna
Moralia. It is a very helpful sentence and proves that the dividing line be-
tween the two kinds of justice is correctly drawn. To act in accordance with
what the norm prescribes indicates that one has a just character; a just char-
acter, however, concerns many things other than mere conformity with spe-
cific laws. As mentioned before, the norm that directs the behavior of a man
deserving the name 'just' extends beyond the limits of any law (be it by sta-
tute or by nature).
Hence we conclude that the two meanings are actually identical." 7 It is
only by trying to find the meaning of 'justice' that we can hope to cope with
the problem of natural law. The vo'zoq, which is the basis of the virtue of
&Katoo v , does not lead us to natural law. The Nicomachean Ethics con-
tains a profound study of this virtue. The question of how it is a mean
(p4o-6&"v) is mentioned (but not solved).118 For the most part the Magna
Moralia neglects to discuss this meaning of justice and concentrates on justice
as equality (to'6rT). In like manner it fails to treat of the ovio-t 8&Katov,
simply because the latter is not a part of the justice understood as equality.
The Magna Moralia concerns itself with justice only insofar as it signifies equal-
ity. When this point of view is taken, then our subject can only be justice as
expressed by public law since equality is the main feature of public law.1 19
In the Magna Moralia it is taken for granted from the beginning that justice
115. dpXoyta. M.M. 1193 a 6, 1193 b 37.
116. E.N. 1130 b 11.
117. C. 1 a 1.
118. E.N. 1108 b 9, 1129 a 4.
119. M.M. 1194 b 9.
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is only public justice (70' 7roXvrLKV &Katov). 120 Justice is what in the 1roXtLK 7
OOa keeps the community together,' 22 provided the community is
understood as a community of equals.
3. We encounter not only the term to-6 n7g in these sentences, but also
another expression for equality, o'lzotdTi13, which may best be translated as
'parity.' "Citizens are joined together by some kind of community; they must
have parity in relation to one another, although they are de facto different." 123
This sentence, striking in itself, is further complicated by the fact that here
we encounter the 0n'c-t3 again. The complete sentence can be read as an im-
perative: Citizens, strive after parity! What does Ot'o-t mean in this con-
nection?
There is another reference to Ofnro- in the Magna Moralia. Perhaps we
can find a guide there. The passage in question 12 4 deals with the ethical
problem of temperance and intemperance. The man who is unrestrained is
characterized as bad by nature.1 2 5 Evidently the meaning here is that the
man is born bad and his bad character cannot be overcome, whereas acquired
habits may undergo a change for the better. Here the natural (4os)
is contrasted with the habitual (Tp&roq) by associating unchangeability
with the former. However, this meaning of On'o-tg cannot explain why parity
should be related to it. Parity is clearly not something static like the restraint
of the temperate man. Rather, it is the goal of our endeavor. People do not
have parity. They want it; they all seek it. So we find no help here.
And so we can assume that in this connection the word Ov'o-&v means
the same as in the passage about natural law, appearing after the argument
that no other justice than iKatov 7roXt7Ko0V manifests equality in its pure
sense.' 26 Equality in its meaning of "parity based on nature" is a reality even
though people recognize their actual inequality. It signifies an equality that is
as a matter of fact practiced. It is not created, but is acknowledged by the
lawgiver (or refused by him). One is tempted to treat nature's impulse to
develop equality into parity as a moral claim. However, Aristotle does not
treat nature in this manner, and for him parity, though not fully realized, is
a basic fact of life.
4. Accordingly, we come back to the question: Why is natural law elimi-
120. M.M. 1194 b 8.
121. M.M. 1194 b 28.
122. M.M. 1194 a 18.
123. cotvovol ol roVra "twes Kai '61roLor fioiov0rat evciat "r fi et, "v &5 Tp61r 'epot.
M.M. 1194 b 9 ff.
124. M.M. 1203 b 24 ff.
125. M.M. 1203 b 23.
126. M.M. 1194 b 29.
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nated from further discussion in the chapter on justice in the Magna Moralia?
We see that people speak about justice in the context of relationships be-
tween father and son, master and slave, husband and wife. 12 7 Later on the
Magna Moralia includes,' 2 8 among others, the relationship between citizen
and non-citizen. These relationships, we are told, do not truly involve justice.
When the term 'justice' is used in speaking of these relationships its meaning
is not the same as it is in other connections. 12 9 When discussing justice in a
scientific manner, the discussing should be confined to public law. The rea-
sons given for the lack of equity in the various cases are, no doubt, interesting
from a sociological or historical point of view, but we cannot deal with them
here. Thus the term 'equality' is not univocal. Father and son, master and
slave, husband and wife are not equals. We have here what the Magna Mor-
alia leaves without a special name and is called in the Nicomachean Ethics
&8KaLOV KaO" jot07r-L7)a, 130 i.e., a kind of quasi-justice which is extensively
dealt with in the Politics.'3 ' Even in the Magna Moralia the use of the ex-
pression &Kau6v T&1 32 shows that, even though the word 'justice' might not
be proper, the relationship in question cannot be described or interpreted ade-
quately without employing the idea of justice. This is confirmed by the fact
that in varying degrees these relationships approach that which should be
called justice. The relationship between husband and wife is nearer to it than
the other ones.133
We now see that these matters in the area of quasi-justice, which are be-
yond the area of justice itself, are dealt with by that 'kind' of justice called
natural justice. Natural law has a quite specific reality. It is not recognized
as justice, but it occupies, in an effective way, an area that would otherwise
be void of rules and norms.
Natural law covers the relationship of people who are, by the lack of par-
ity and therefore of equality, excluded from the blessings and the protection
of justice. There is no hint that such a replacement is natural in the sense in
which the innate qualities or privileges of human beings are natural. Natural
law, as described in the Magna Moralia, does not result from any moral claims.
It denotes actual customs that govern certain relationships between people in a
way very similar to that in which justice reigns. These customs must have
been in active use as a general rule for a certain amount of time.
127. M.M. 1194 b 5 ff.
128. M.M. 1211 a 8.
129. M.M. 1194 b 6.
130. E.N. 1134 a 30.
131. Cf. Chapter III and note 96, supra.
132. M.M. 1194 b 5.
133. M.M. 1194 b 25.
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It is essential to realize that natural law (according to the Magna Moralia)
is not common law (in the meaning this term has in England). It is not a
right founded upon custom, and it is no Gewohnheitsrecht. Whenever such
a common law is recognized as being on equal footing with promulgated law,
it derives its validity, as does natural law, from actual practice over a given
period of time when everybody concerned believes and trusts it to be legal
law (e.g., right of way). Its validity is not based on moral or natural hy-
potheses. Such a common law does not increase the *circle of civic peers, nor
does it create a new kind of justice. The distinction in the Magna Moralia
between natural law and legal law parallels the distinction in Roman law
134
between ius civile and ius gentium. Although the two pairs of terms are not
identical in meaning, yet the comparison clarifies the distinction in the Magna
Moralia. However, the rotrTwov &'Katov excludes non-citizens in the same
way as ius civile does. This means that there are certain groups in the popu-
lation who are in commercial contact and who, therefore, seek protection as
a 'natural' consequence of this living together. In both cases it is some kind
of lack of legal provisions concerning non-citizens that has given rise to the
tendency to create an analogue to the law that excludes non-citizens. The
analogue is based upon the actual conduct of the members of the community
over a given period of time.
Certain groups of people are not considered as fully participating in the ex-
isting legal order. If this is true, then the same is true of certain problems and
certain questions that are not yet ready for final legislation. The reason all mem-
bers of the community are not treated as equals is that, for the time being,
no way can be found to extend equality to them in certain isolated areas such
as housing, job opportunities, or social activities. Here, too, we see life being
regulated by certain rules of behavior, valid for the greater number of cases
involved during an extended period of time. These rules are accepted without
any effort being made to find out the legal aspects of the situation. Finally,
however, the concept of justice is brought to bear on these problems, and
previous methods of treating them are, after examination, accepted or rejected.
These considerations lead us to regard the question of equality as the fun-
damental problem of justice. The way this problem is solved in the totality
of the applicable norms reveals the stand we take towards the actual inequal-
ity of men. It should be the aim of our rational thinking to extend equality
to all men in order to bring about what is 'just.' It is the tragedy 135 of jus-
tice to destroy to a certain extent the individuality of its subjects when its only
134. See, for instance, SOHM-MITTEIS-WENOER, INSTITUTIONEN 64 if; VOGT, 1 DIE
LEHRE VOM IUS NATURALE, AEQUUM ET BONUM UND IUS GENTIUM DER R6MER 198.
135. See my DAs RECIT ALS IDEE UND ALS SATZUNG 31 (1929).
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purpose is to serve these subjects. Natural law is the eternal doubt hovering
over any solution that is given effect at a given time; but not more than a
doubt.
On the other hand, we might ask if the fact that there are certain rules
in actual use which are distinct from specific laws proves that these rules ought
to be accepted as laws. Is the very existence of natural law (in the meaning
of the Magna Moralia) enough to vindicate its transition into legal law? Cer-
tainly not. But we may ask if this potentiality of the natural law is the reason
why it is called better (/3 EXrtov) 136 when compared with the statute law.
One is not persuaded by this argument. It would be hard to understand
why in a treatise on ethics the 'better' law should be excluded from any dis-
cussion. It is more to the point, however, to consider that a few lines earlier
137
we find the same word ('better'), and it is not used here to make a moral
judgment. The right hand, despite the possibility of the equal usefulness of
the left hand, remains 6EXTLov, and this "by nature" (q'o-ve). The mean-
ing can only be that the right hand is, as a rule, and not only for a limited
time of our experience, more apt, more serviceable, more fit to do what we
are aiming at when using our hands. Suppose, as is highly probable, f3&Ttov
has the same meaning in both places. Then the meaning would be that nat-
ural law serves better the task of justice as a whole; it is capable of answering
questions that are unavoidable in our social life, but are beyond the capacity
of justice if we adhere only to our public laws. In a primitive society, natural
law would cover our needs; in an advanced state of civilization legal law is
inadequate as soon as it makes limiting suppositions.
The term 'equity' appears in the Magna Moralia.138 This idea of equity,
however, is not related to the problem of natural law as it is there understood.
In similar lines in the Nicomachean Ethics 139 we learn how and under what
conditions a man should be satisfied with less than what is due to him from
a legal point of view.
V
We may sum up as follows. The Rhetoric gives a vivid picture of the pop-
ular opinions about natural law and its undeniable charm. We learn what
might be said in favor of as well as against natural law. No judgment is
passed on natural law, and its moral value is not compared with that of the
136. M.M. 1195 a 6.
137. M.M. 1194 b 36.
138. M.M. 1198 b 24 ff.
139. E.N. 1138 a 1.
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law we encounter in daily life. Both the Magna Moralia and the Nicoma-
chean Ethics go deeper than this. They reveal a very serious problem hidden
behind a slogan. It might have been a temptation to build a theory starting
from one of the meanings1 40 of the term 0Vio-it; but both works face the
facts presented by the experiences of our daily life and try. to analyze them.
They differ fundamentally in the way they do this.
The Magna Moralia recognizes natural law as a permanent assault on a
law which is in danger of becoming satisfied with the status quo. However,
the Magna Moralia does not attempt to establish a dogma capable of leading
to a concise doctrine of justice. Rather, it seeks to stimulate the confirmation
of answers that might be given to vital questions.
The Nicomachean Ethics cuts through the uncertainty innate in the term.
It surpasses the Magna Moralia in relating the isolated problem to the roots
of philosophical thought. We are asked to rely on nothing but scientific proof
when accepting a proposition as based on natural law. Otherwise we are to
take the problem out of the purview of natural law. It is no small accom-
plishment to grasp the importance of the fact that we argue a great deal about
things that may be oi ro 1 a'XX&. We often do not realize that the 'right'
answer to some questions cannot be proved in the way a thesis of science or
morals can be proved.
When we see the problems in this perspective, we become aware that the
"a priori" of justice is "prior" to the problem of natural law. The "a priori"
of justice deals with the conditions that must be met by rules - whether or
not they appear as laws or whether they appear as natural or legal laws - if
they are to be called rules of justice. The problem of natural law is extremely
complex. Aristotle's teachings provide us with significant answers; they leave
us also with a better understanding of the magnitude of the problem.
140. M. 1014 b 17 ff.
